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cycle. For West German data from 1960.i to 1989.iv we conclude that our measures
of shocks are indeed exogenous. This contrasts with similar studies for other countries
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I. Introduction
Small scale dynamic general equilibrium models have become the dominant tool of business
cycle analysis. The driving force of these models are a few stochastic processes that mimic
either demand or supply shocks that continually hit the economy. These shocks trigger intra-
and intertemporal substitution between leisure, consumption, and asset holdings that cause
patterns similar to those found in macroeconomic time series. If this story is a credible
explanation of the business cycle, the various shock measures used should be exogenous in
the sense that they are not themselves caused by other variables that one might regard as
alternative driving forces of the cycle.
Among the most prominent shock measures is the Solow residual, i.e., that part of output
growth which is not due to increased use of labor and capital. The seminal papers of Kydland
and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983) aim to show that a great part of observed
output fluctuations is explained by shocks to total factor productivity approximated by the
Solow residual. Consequently, a couple of papers explore the exogeneity of this measure of
supply shocks. Table I.1 presents the results of studies known to us that are close in spirit
to our work.1 Except for the paper by Paquet and Robidoux (2001) their findings do not
support the hypothesis that the Solow Residual is an exogenous driving force of business
cycles. Rather, it appears that monetary, fiscal, and world market variables are responsible
for aggregate fluctuations.
Apologists of the real business cycle framework ascribe this lack of exogeneity to variable
utilization rates of capital and labor2, and cyclical markups3.
Holland and Scott (1998) extend the basic framework and introduce stochastic shifts of the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption into an otherwise standard real
business cycle model to capture demand shocks. Yet, also this measure of shocks is Granger
caused by M4, the oil price, and the terms of trade.
In this paper, we examine the issue of the exogeneity of shocks for the German economy.
Our motivation it twofold. First, we want to add another piece of evidence to an ongoing
debate. Second, we consider the case of the German economy especially interesting: as it is
1We have excluded the paper of Hall (1988), who finds that the annual growth rate of the US Solow residual
is contemporaneously correlated with the growth rates of military spending and the world price of crude oil,
respectively. The focus of this paper is the assumption of perfect competition, and not the exogeneity of the
quarterly Solow residual as a measure of supply shocks. Furthermore, Halls methodology, t-tests in bivariate
regression analysis, differs from the VAR-approach used in the studies summarized in Table I.1.
2See Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1993), Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996), Finn (1995), Paquet
and Robidoux (2001)
3See Hornstein (1993), Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), and Hairault and Portier (1993)
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Table I.1:
Synopsis of Exogeneity Studies
Author(s) Country Shock Measure Granger caused by Period
Cozier and Gupta
(1993)




Evans (1992) US Solow Residual Narrow Money (M1),






UK Solow Residual Oil Price, Total Tax
Revenues
1965.1-1994.4
Preference Shift Broad Money (M4), Oil









widely acknowledged,4 its labor market is far from being as flexible as those of the countries
considered so far. Thus, if labor hoarding and market power are at the root of the problem,
we expect that simple shock measures will fail to be exogenous on a grand scale.
Like in Holland and Scott (1998) our starting point is not a sophisticated dynamic general
equilibrium model of the business cycle that encompasses many if not all of the monetary and
real frictions that have been studied so far within this framework. Instead, we want to see
whether simple models, irrespective of at what other margins they may fail, are discredited
in the first place, since the shock measures they use are explained by other forces outside of
the model. For this reason and since we want to see whether there are any differences to the
studies mentioned in Table I.1, we first consider the usual Solow residual and the preference
shift measure introduced by Holland and Scott (1998). To shed some light on the question of
variable capacity utilization as well as to check for the robustness of our results with respect to
small variations of the model’s setup, we then consider shocks from a model that incorporates
oil price shocks, capital hoarding and a declining trend in per capita working hours.
We consider the period 1960 to 2001, divided into three subperiods for which reasonably
consistent quarterly time series exist. The smallest sample covers the time period 76.i to
89.iv. We have chosen this period for the following reasons. First, we want to exclude possible
structural breaks associated with the German reunification in 1990. Second, considering the
4See, e.g., Siebert (1997).
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time between 1960 (from where onwards quarterly national accounts are available) and the
mid nineteen seventies, there is evidence that the West German economy was catching up to its
long-run growth path. However, the calibration of the model’s parameters that are necessary
to identify the technology and the preference shock rely on the steady-state assumption.
Despite this problem, and to check the robustness of our results both with respect to the
choice of the model’s deep parameters and the period considered, we extend the sample to
the period 60.i to 89.iv. Economic data for the post unification period are available from
1991.i onwards. They refer to the 1995 European System of National Accounts which differs
in a number of respects from the former German System of National Accounts developed in
the late 1950s. Thus, in addition to the break related to German unification, there are breaks
in many major economic aggregates due to conceptual changes in national accounting. Data
that are consistent to those from the post-unification era date back to 1970. Therefore, our
third data set covers the period 70.i to 01.iv.
Using the traditional Solow residual and the Holland and Scott (1998) preference shock
as well as the more elaborate model, we identify two different measures of the technology
and preference shocks and test within an error correction framework their exogeneity with
respect to government consumption, taxes, M1 and M3, short-term and long-term interest
rates, exports, and the terms of trade. We conduct 161 different tests, 105 of which pertain to
the two West German subsamples. Out of these 105 tests only 5 (less than the type I error)
reject the null of no Granger causality. In the case of our third subsample, 70.i to 01.iv, we
find evidence that all four of our shock measures are Granger caused by M3. However, this
finding may be related to the jumps in this aggregate due to the German monetary union
(effective on July 1, 1990), about two quarters before the jump in the national accounts, and
the European monetary union (effective on January 1, 1999).
Different from the existing evidence for Canada, the UK, and the US, our results support
the view that the German, and in particular the West German measures of technology and
preference shocks may be regarded as driving forces of the business cycle in small scale models
of economic fluctuations. In the period where the identifying assumption of a balanced growth
path is most plausible, the shocks from the model with variable capacity utilization show no
sign of Granger causality. We interpret this as evidence in favor of the slightly more complex
model. In addition, this result corroborates the view of Paquet and Robidoux (2001) who
ascribe the lack of exogeneity of the Solow residual found by the other studies mentioned in
Table I.1 to their assumption of full capacity utilization.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. The next section sets up the theoretical
framework we use to identify our shock measures. In Section III, we derive the shocks from
the data and test for Granger causality. Section IV concludes.
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II. Theoretical Framework
1. A Basic Model
The basic real business cycle model with a technology and a preference shock consists of a




βsu(Ct+s, 1 −Nt+s, θt+s), β ∈ (0, 1)
subject to Kt+s+1 ≤ (1 − δ)Kt+s + F (Nt+s, Kt+s, At+s) − Ct+s, Kt given.
(II.1)
Utility u at period t+s depends upon consumption Ct+s, leisure 1−Nt+s, and the realization of
the preference shock θt+s. Expected life-time utility at time t is the discounted flow of utilities
u with discount factor βs attached to utility obtained s periods hence. Output is a function F
of working hours Nt+s, capital services Kt+s, and the stochastic level of technological progress
At+s. Future capital Kt+s+1 is equal to the stock of capital inherited from the previous period
(1 − δ)Kt+s, where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the rate of depreciation, plus investment F (·) − Ct+s.
Given representations of both the current-period utility function u and the production
function F , the usual procedure is to compute measures of θt and At from actual data using
the first order conditions of (II.1).
As in the studies summarized in Table I.1, we parameterize F (·) as a constant-returns-to-
scale Cobb-Douglas function
F (Nt, Kt, At) := B(AtNt)
αK1−αt , α ∈ (0, 1), B > 0, (II.2)
where labor-augmenting technological progress At evolves according to
At+1 = Ate
a+εAt+1 , a ≥ 0, ε ∼ N(0, σA). (II.3)
To derive the preference shock, we specify u as in Holland and Scott (1998) as




, η > 0. (II.4)















Equations (II.5) and (II.6) allow us to derive the model’s shocks from the national accounts.
Before we proceed towards that goal, we develop a more elaborate version of this model that
captures two distinctive features of the West German economy: First, working hours per
member of the work force have steadily declined since the nineteen sixties.5 Second, West
Germany depends on energy imports.6
2. A More Elaborate Model
To account for the decline in working hours, we follow Lucke (1997) and assume that the
disutility of labor increases with the level of technological knowledge. Therefore, we measure
leisure as 1 − Aψt Nt, with ψ > 0, in the household’s utility function u.
We use the device developed by Finn (1995) to model the dependence on energy imports




1−α, α ∈ (0, 1), B > 0, (II.7)
where, as before, At is the level of labor-augmenting technical progress and Nt are working
hours. Different from the basic model, we allow for less than full utilization of capital Kt
and let vt denote the respective utilization rate. The process that governs At is still given by
(II.3).
Let Wt and Rt denote the real wage and the rental rate of capital services vtKt. Profit








Rt = (1 − α)
Yt
vtKt
= (1 − α)B(AtNt)
α(vtKt)
−α. (II.8b)
The household accumulates capital according to
Kt+1 = (1 − δ(vt))Kt + It (II.9a)
δ(vt) := v
ω
t /ω, ω ≥ 1, (II.9b)
5We document this fact in Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix and discuss its implications in the section
on calibration. The Appendix can be downloaded from
http://www.wiwi.uni-augsburg.de/vwl/maussner/lehrstuhl/maussner/pap/dobc appendix.pdf.
6The average ratio of imports of oil to GDP between 1960 an 1989 is 2.15 percent as compared to 1.18
percent (1965-1989) for the US (see 2005 Economic Report of the President), and 0.8 percent (1987-2003)
for the UK (see International Trade Statistics Yearbook, Volume I Trade by Country (2002,1998,1994,1990)
United Nations, New York).
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where It denotes the household’s investment expenditures. The dependence of the rate of
depreciation δ on the utilization rate of capital vt captures the idea that wear and tear
increase with a more intense use of the capital equipment. This assumption dates back to
papers by Taubman and Wilkinson (1970) and Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988),
and was also employed by Finn (1995) and by Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996) to account
for factor hoarding over the business cycle.
To account for the influence of energy prices, we follow Finn (1995) and assume that the




= vγt /γ, γ ≥ 1. (II.10)
The household spends its net income, i.e., wages WtNt and capital rents RtvtKt less govern-
ment taxes Tt, on energy imports ptZt, consumption Ct, and investment It. Thus, its budget
constraint is:
It + Ct ≤ WtNt +RtvtKt − Tt − ptZt. (II.11)










subject to (II.9) and (II.11). The first order conditions for optimal time sequences imply:
Λt = C
−η




A−ψt WtΛt = θtC
1−η
















where Λt is the shadow price of capital accumulation. According to (II.12a), this shadow
price equals the marginal utility of consumption. (II.12b) states that the marginal disutility
of an additional hour of work has to be compensated by the increase of utility derived from
spending the extra income generated on consumption. Equation (II.12c) balances the marginal
costs and benefits of changing the utilization rate of capital. The rate of change of the price
of new capital is determined in equation (II.12d). It balances the current utility loss of
saving one extra unit of output, Λt, with its discounted expected future utility gain, the
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latter being equal to the discounted expected utility increase from spending the gross return
1 − δ(vt+1) − pt+1(Zt+1/Kt+1) + rt+1vt+1 on consumption in the next period.
We model government expenditures as a pure transfer of resources from the private to
the public sector without any feed-back effects that would arise if they were considered an
argument of either the household’s utility function or the economy’s production function.
This transfer grows deterministically at the same rate as output increases in the long run, so
that the government does not contribute to economic fluctuations. These assumptions can be




where gY is the growth rate of output on a balanced growth path, which is derived in the
following section.
3. Dynamics
We want to calibrate the model’s deep parameters from its implications for a deterministic
balanced growth path. Our next task is, thus, to seek a transformation that yields new
variables being constant on such a path. It is obvious from the utility function that Aψt Nt
must be constant in the long run. Thus, we define nt := A
ψ
t Nt. Furthermore, in the steady
state both the capital-output ratio Kt/Yt and the utilization rate of capital vt should be
constant. Thus, from equation (II.8b), the steady-state rental rate of capital Rt is constant.
We can use this implication to look for an adequate transformation of the capital stock:
Rt = (1 − α)B(AtNt)
α(vtKt)
−α,






The last line tells us that ultimately the capital stock will grow at the rate of gK = e
a(1−ψ)−1.





which guarantees that the new variable is predetermined at the beginning of period t as a result
of past realizations of the technology shock and past investment decisions. The equilibrium













from which we see that wt := Wt/At is stationary. It is obvious from the household’s budget
constraint that in the long run consumption and government expenditures must grow at the
same rate as the capital stock. Therefore, we define ct := CtA
ψ−1
t , gt := GtA
ψ−1
t and derive











Given these definitions, we combine equations (II.7), (II.8), (II.9), (II.11), and (II.12) and









































We get the deterministic counterpart of our model by replacing the technology shock,
the preference shock, and the energy-price shock by their expected values of ea, θ and p,
respectively. This permits us to omit the expectation operator. If we further drop time
indices, the system of equations (II.13) determines the model’s long-run equilibrium. We use
these relations to calibrate the model to German data.
If nt := A
ψ
t Nt is constant and ψ > 0, hours per capita decline at the rate gN = e
−aψ − 1
and output grows at the rate gY = e
a(1−ψ) − 1. Thus, we can use the long-run rate of output
growth gY and the rate of change of hours per capita gN to infer ψ and a from
ln(1 + gY ) = a(1 − ψ),
ln(1 + gN) = −aψ.
(II.14)
We set the long-run rate of capital depreciation δ equal to the average rate of capital
depreciation and compute this rate from quarterly data of depreciation and the capital stock.
We construct the latter from yearly data of the capital stock and quarterly data of net
investment expenditures via the perpetual inventory method.
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The Euler equation for the price of new capital




provides two options to infer the magnitude of the discount factor β. Given information on
the long-run gross rate of return on equities q and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution





Alternatively, using the stationary version of (II.8b), equation (II.15) may also be written as
1 = βe−η(1−ψ)a
(










which allows us to derive β from the capital-output ratio K/Y , the fraction of output spent
on energy imports (pZ/Y ), and the elasticity of production with respect to labor α. As usual,
the latter parameter is set equal to the long-run wage share.
We derive point estimates of γ, ω, and v from the fraction of output spent on energy
imports ζ := (pZ/Y ), the rate of capital depreciation δ, and the capital-output ratio K/Y .
Notice that equations (II.13d) and (II.13e) imply
























Thus, together with the definitions in (II.9b) and (II.10), the following system of equations






















where p is the average relative price of imported energy.
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III. Productivity and Preference Shocks
1. Identification of the Shocks
Given the model’s deep parameters, we are able to construct the productivity and preference
shocks from the model’s equations and published data.
Equations (II.8b) and (II.12c) imply:
vωt + ptv
γ




Together with the law for capital accumulation (II.9) and an initial value of the capital stock,
this equation implies an empirical series for the utilization rate of capital vt from published
data on output Yt, the relative price of imported energy pt, and investment expenditures It.
Given the series on vt and Kt, we derive the level of technical progress from the production




We use the value of B to normalize At=1 ≡ 1. Given this series we construct nt = A
ψ
t Nt and







using data on output and consumption.7 These equations are the counterparts to the simpler
shock measures given in (II.6) and (II.5).
2. Calibration
We estimate the deep parameters of the model for three subperiods to check the robustness of
our results. The period that fits the theoretical assumptions closest covers 1976.i to 1989.iv.
Between 1960 and the mid nineteen seventies, the West German consumption share in output
steadily increased, as it may happen along the transition path to a steady state equilibrium.
On such a path, the growth rate of per-capita output exceeds the growth rate of labor aug-
menting technical progress and the average productivity of capital as well as the real interest
rate are above their long-run values. Thus, estimates of these parameters from time series
averages during transition periods are biased upwards, and we expect more reliable estimates
7Note that equation (III.3) combines equations (II.13b) and (II.13c). Thus, it is not possible to use these
equations to derive different measures of the wage per efficiency unit of labor wt. The same applies to equations
(II.13d) and (II.13e), which we combine to construct vt via equation (III.1).
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if we restrict attention to the period after 76.i. Data after 1990 reflect the economic conse-
quences of the German reunification, which was without doubt a major economic shock that
put the German economy on a new transition path, raising similar estimation problems. The
drawback from this restriction is obvious: our tests may suffer from low power due to a lack
of degrees of freedom: There are 55 observations on each variable. Some of our equations
have up to 18 regressor (including the error correction term) leaving only 37 degrees of free-
dom. Therefore, we extend our sample to cover the period 60.i to 89.iv, the longest period
for which quarterly economic data for West Germany are available. Due to changes in the
German system of national accounts in the mid nineteen nineties we are currently not able
to extend the sample further to cover 60.i to 01.iv. Data consistent with the new European
system of national accounts only date back to 70.i. Therefore, our third subsample covers the
period 70.i to 01.iv. In the following, we sketch the parameter selection for the first subsample
and summarize the results together with those for the other subsamples in Table III.2.
To take account of the representative agent character of our model, we use per-capita data
on output, consumption, investment, capital, and working hours. If not otherwise mentioned,
we use seasonally-adjusted time series from the database provided by the German Institute of
Economic Research (DIW). Our measure of output is the gross domestic product per capita
at factor prices, which grew at an average quarterly rate of gY = 0.47%. Between 1976.i and
1989.iv hours per capita declined at an average quarterly rate of gN = 0.08% . This trend
reflects three different developments:8 1) the declining trend in hours per employee, 2) the
increasing rate of unemployment, and 3) the increasing labor force participation rate. In the
framework of a representative agent model, facts 1) and 3) clearly indicate long-term shifts
in the leisure-consumption preferences. Whether fact 2) reflects increasing marginal disutility
of labor or is the outcome of market failures is the subject of lively debates between different
macroeconomic schools of thought. However, even if one takes the position that labor market
rigidities are at the core of the problem, the decreasing employment rate in the nineteen-
eighties reflects a long-term, structural phenomenon and should thus not be mixed up with
cyclical fluctuations. For these reasons, we think it is justified to model decreasing hours per
capita as a trend and not as a cyclical phenomenon in model two. Inserting gY = 0.0047 and
gN = 0.0008 in (II.14) we find that the average quarterly growth rate of labor-augmenting
technical progress is a = 0.0055 and that the interaction parameter between the disutility of
labor and the level of technological progress is ψ = 0.144.
We combine the yearly data of the capital stock provided by the German Statistical Office
8See Figure A.2 in the Appendix and note that hours per capita equal hours per employee times the
employment ratio times the labor force participation rate.
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(Statistisches Bundesamt) and quarterly data on depreciation and gross investment to com-
pute a quarterly series of the capital stock. Let K̄j and Kt denote the stock of capital at the
beginning of year j = 0, 1, ..., 13 and at the beginning of quarter t = 1, 2, ..., 56, respectively.
For t = 4j + 1, we set Kt = K̄j, and for t = 4j + 1 + s, s = 1, 2, 3, we compute Kt from





where It and Dt are gross investment and depreciation of quarter t. Given this measure of
capital we set δ equal to the average of Dt/Kt, which yields δ = 0.0108.
The average expenditure on raw-oil imports as a fraction of the gross domestic product at
factor prices is ζ = 0.0215. The wage share in the gross domestic product at factor prices is
α = 0.72. We derived this figure assuming that the wage income of a self-employed person
equals the average wage per employee.
To circumvent assumptions about the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the adequate
measure of the long-run return on capital, we use the average capital-output ratio k/y =
0.0774 in (II.18) to infer γ, ω and v. This yields the long-run utilization rate of capital





76.i to 89.iv 60.i to 89.iv 70.i to 01.iv
a 0.0055 0.0095 0.0067
ν 0.1436 0.2934 0.2485
Y/K 0.0774 0.0825 0.0750
α 0.7235 0.7248 0.7136
δ 0.0108 0.0105 0.0117
ζ 0.0186 0.0215 0.0155
We used the same procedure to find the parameters for the period 60.i to 89.iv. Our
estimates of the trend in output and working hours (both per capita) for the third period
assume a sudden shift of the trend line in the first quarter of 1991 but unchanged growth
rates. Table III.2 summarizes our choice of parameter values. The wage share α and the
rate of depreciation δ are almost the same in all three subperiods. As expected, the growth
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rate of labor augmenting technical progress a and capital productivity Y/K are larger in the
second subperiod. The negative trend in per-capita working hours was more pronounced in
the second period resulting in a much larger value of ψ. Our estimate of this parameter for
the third period is of comparable size, reflecting the fact that the still positive trend of the
participation rate is more than offset by declining working hours per employee and a still
negative trend in the employment ratio.9
3. Shock Measures
We are now able to construct our measures of productivity and preference shocks. We illus-
trate the main differences between our benchmark model and the more elaborate model with
respect to the first subperiod. The same findings apply to the second and third subsample.
Figure III.1: Oil Price Shocks and Utilization Rate of Capital
Figure III.2: Productivity and Preference Shocks: 76.i to 89.iv
Figure III.1 displays the relative price of oil as given by the oil price index compiled at the
9See Figure A.3 in the Appendix.
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Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA). As can be seen from the right panel
of Figure III.1, the price increase in the nineteen eighties let the utilization rate of capital
drop sharply.
As a consequence, the traditional method to compute the Solow Residual from (II.6) sys-
tematically overestimates the productivity shocks during the period of high oil prices. This
can be seen from the left panel of Figure III.2, where the solid line depicts the usual measure
of the Solow Residual. The broken line shows the productivity shock computed from (III.2).
The right panel of Figure III.2 displays the preference shock. If measured by (II.5), the decline
in working hours shows up in an upward sloping trend of the solid line. The dashed line rep-
resents the preference shock measure from (III.3). We will refer to the shocks from the basic
model as model-one shocks and to those from the more elaborate model as model-two shocks.
More or less the same picture emerges for the period 60.i to 89.iv shocks depicted in the
left panel of Figure III.3.
Being a singular event, the German reunification is a major obstacle for the identification
of shocks at business cycle frequencies. Since the trends in working hours per employee, the
employment rate and the participation rate are unbroken by this event,10 the major layoffs in
the eastern part of Germany appear as a sharp and sudden downward deviation from the trend
in per capita working hours. Both models interpret this as a huge increase in the disutility
of labor. This is certainly not a very credible story, and it may distort our results, but our
simple framework provides no way around it. Given the well known low quality of public
infrastructure and the obsolete private capital stock in the Neue Länder it is not surprising
that both measures of the productivity shock indicate a collapse of productivity.
The size of the shocks derived from both models imply economic fluctuations of about
the empirically observed magnitude. We illustrate this in Table A.1 in the Appendix that
displays the results of simulations of both models using the implied time series properties of
our shock measures. For instance, the standard deviation of the HP-filtered West German
GDP per capita at factor costs is 1.12 vis a vis 1.51 (2.05) of the respective simulation of
model one (model two). The simulations confirm well known properties of this kind of models
(see, e.g., Heer and Maussner (2005), Chapter 1). Consumption is less variable in the two
models than empirically, while the reverse holds for investment. The return to capital in
both models is about as volatile as output and thus overstates the fluctuations of the real
interest rate on three month loans, which is perhaps not a very good indicator of the return on
risky investments. The autocorrelations and cross-correlations with output are quite in line
between the models and the data. From the 17 moments displayed in Table A.1 ten moments
10See Figure A.3 in the Appendix.
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Figure III.3: Productivity and Preference Shocks, 60.i to 89.iv and 70.i to 01.iv
from model two are closer or as close to the empirical figures than the respective moments
from model one, indicating that this model performs slightly better.
4. Granger Causality Tests
Exogenous Variables We investigate the exogeneity of our measures of the productivity
and the preference shock in the framework of Granger causality tests. If these shocks are
indeed the driving forces of the business cycle, it should be impossible to predict them from
past realizations of other variables that are also exogenous to the model. Since we have
assumed that government expenditures and, hence, tax revenues grow at a constant rate, we
include measures of both variables in the set of plausible driving forces of the German business
cycle. We capture monetary shocks with a narrow (M1) and a broad (M3) measure of money
supply, as well as with a short-term and a long-term nominal interest rate. Exports, the terms
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of trade, and the price of oil are used to indicate demand and supply side shocks that originate
in the world market. This list of variables comprises those found as predictors of productivity
and preference shocks in the studies cited in Table I.1 except for US GDP. Instead of this
variable, we use total exports as a measure of world market demand for German products.
Like our shocks, these variables are either upward trending or display a highly persistent
behavior (see Figure A.4 in the Appendix). Before we can proceed with running regressions,
we must determine the nature of this non-stationarity.
Unit Roots Tests We report the results of various unit roots test in Tables A.2 to A.4 in
the Appendix. For the first and second subperiod we computed the augmented Dickey-Fuller
t-statistic, the Phillips-Perron Zt statistic as well as the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin
(KPSS) statistic. Taking into account the break in 1991, we used Perron’s extension of the
ADF-test for the third subperiod.
There is only one variable where the unit-root assumption seems doubtful. For both the
first and the second subperiod, the ADF-t-statistic rejects the unit root for the short-term
interest rate, whereas the KPSS-statistic is not able to reject the converse null of stationarity.
For the period 70.i to 01.iv, a unit root in the short-term interest rate is rejected at the 10
percent level. For the sake of a unified treatment, we consider the short-term interest rate
I(1), too. The tests are not able to reject the unit-root assumption in the case of our second
measure of the preference shock, which, by construction, should be stationary. Since it is well
known that unit-root tests have small power against the alternative of a nearly integrated
process, this finding should come as no surprise. We follow the recommendation of Banerjee
et al. (1993:95) and treat this case as I(1) rather than as I(0).
Estimation Framework Under this proposition, we need to check whether variables that
enter in a bivariate or multivariate vector autoregression (VAR) are cointegrated. If so, the
adequate framework to pursue Granger causality tests is the following autoregressive vector
























Here xt is one of our shock measures and zt is a subset of the variables that we consider to
Granger cause the respective shock measure. The symbol ∆ denotes first differences, A11 and
A21 are polynomials in the lag operator L, whereas A12 and A22 are matrix polynomials in
L that conform to the size of the vector zt. If the variables xt and zt are cointegrated, the
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expressions (xt−1 − β1zt−1) and (xt−1 − β2zt−1) capture deviations of the variables from their
long-run equilibrium.
In this setting, the variables in zt jointly Granger cause the shock measure xt if the co-
efficients of A12 are significantly different from zero. We follow Holland and Scott (1998)
and do not test whether the matrix α1 is different from zero. The error correction term in
the first equation captures the propagation of shocks but not their origin. Consider, e.g., a
negative preference shock that temporarily lowers output growth. When tax revenues are tied
to output, government expenditures will also fall below their trend path and help to predict
future output growth.
Without cointegration, we have to drop the error correction term and estimate the VAR
in first differences.
Cointegration Tests We use the Johansen (1988, 1992) cointegration test. To select the
appropriate VAR order, we use the Akaike (AIC) and the Hannan-Quinn (HQ) information
criteria.11 We allowed for at most 8 lags in levels. We report our results for the first two
subperiods in Tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix. There are a number of instances where
either the trace or the maximum eigenvalue statistic (or even both) indicate two cointegrating
relations at the five percent level of significance. Since this contrasts with our unit root tests,
we accepted this conclusion only if both the trace and the maximum eigenvalue statistic
exceed the one percent critical value.12 This occurs in four out of a total of 105 cointegration
tests we performed for the first and second subperiod. In these cases we estimated a VAR in
levels including a linear time trend.
Cointegration tests for the third subperiod must deal with the problem that most of our
time series display a marked break in the first quarter in 1991. If we disregard this break,
the tests are not able to reject the null of no cointegration, except in a few cases. When we
include a dummy variable that accounts for the break, the critical values of the Johansen test
are strictly speaking not applicable. If we ignore this problem and take the critical values
as indicative of cointegration, we find evidence for one cointegrating relation in about two-
thirds of the tests performed (see Table A.7 in the Appendix). To circumvent this problem
we performed Grange causality test for both first differences and levels. In the latter case we
assumed one cointegrating relation.
11For a definition of these statistics in the framework of vector autoregressive models see, e.g., Lütkepohl
(1991), equations (4.3.2) and (4.3.8).
12Note that if a VAR in n I(0)- and/or I(1)-variables has n cointegrating relations then the VAR is stationary
in levels. In this case, however, all of its individual elements must be stationary, i.e., I(0).
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Table III.3:
Bivariate Granger Causality Tests 76.i-89.iv
Model-One Shock Measures
Variable Productivity Preferences
AIC HQ AIC HQ
q r p q r p q r p q r p
Government Expenditures 8 0 0.00 1 0 . 5 0 0.46 5 0 0.46
Taxes 8 0 0.04 5 0 0.20 4 0 0.29 1 0 .
M1 8 1 0.56 1 0 . 4 0 0.77 1 0 .
M3 8 1 0.43 5 0 0.58 5 0 0.37 5 0 0.37
Short-Term Interest Rate 5 0 0.18 5 0 0.18 2 0 0.29 2 0 0.29
Long-Term Interest Rate 5 0 0.42 1 0 . 3 0 0.81 1 0 .
Exports 5 0 0.65 5 0 0.65 8 0 0.73 2 0 0.38
Terms of Trade 6 0 0.62 6 0 0.62 6 0 0.54 5 0 0.33
Oil Price 5 0 0.81 2 0 0.44 4 0 0.70 2 0 0.25
Model-Two Shock Measures
Variable Productivity Preferences
AIC HQ AIC HQ
q r p q r p q r p q r p
Government Expenditures 1 0 . 1 0 . 8 1 0.33 5 0 0.48
Taxes 5 0 0.43 1 0 . 4 0 0.15 1 0 .
M1 1 1 . 1 1 . 4 0 0.45 1 0 .
M3 8 1 0.40 8 1 0.40 5 0 0.16 5 0 0.16
Short-Term Interest Rate 5 0 0.33 5 0 0.33 2 0 0.24 2 0 0.24
Long-Term Interest Rate 1 0 . 1 0 . 3 0 0.84 1 0 .
Exports 5 0 0.99 1 0 . 8 0 0.74 2 0 0.29
Terms of Trade 6 0 0.77 6 0 0.77 6 0 0.27 5 1 0.31
Notes:
AIC: Lag length selected according to Akaike’s information criterium,
HQ: lag length selected according to Hannan-Quinn’s information criterium,
q: number of lags considered,
r: number of cointegration relations, where r=2 indicates that we run the regression in levels,
p: marginal level of significance for the null that the shock measure is not Granger caused by the variable
in column 1.
Results of the Causality Tests Table III.3 presents the results of the bivariate Granger
causality tests for the period 76.i to 89.iv. If the lag length criteria arrive at different con-
clusions about the number of lags q in the VAR in levels, we performed the test for both
lag lengths. In the case of q = 1, neither the VEC(1) nor the corresponding VAR(0) in dif-
ferences includes lagged differences, and no variable is able to Granger cause the respective
other variable. We marked these instances with a dot.
There are two instances out of a total of 54 tests where we have to accept Granger causality:
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the model-one Solow residual is Granger caused by government expenditures (at q = 8) and
by taxes (also at q = 8). Since the productivity shock is unable to predict government
expenditures (the p–value for this null is 0.71), causality seems indeed to run from government
expenditures to the productivity shock. In the case of taxes, causality is mutual. Yet, in VARs
with a smaller order we are unable to reject the null in either case. None of our model-two
shocks seems to be Granger caused by the variables listed in the left column of Table A.7. We
interpret this as supportive of the model with variable capacity utilization, thus confirming
the results of Paquet and Robidoux (2001) for Canada.
We have already remarked in Section 2. that it may well be that these tests suffer from
low power. Our time series are rather short (56 observations each) and in many instances
the required lag length is considerable so that there are few degrees of freedom.13 This is one
reason to extend the observation period back to the first quarter of 1960. Table III.4 presents
the outcome of the Granger causality test for this larger data set (120 observations in each
series).
Here we run 51 different tests, 3 of which reject our null. The model-one productivity
shock is Granger caused by the long-term interest rate at a lag length of q = 6, the model-two
productivity shock by M3 at q = 6 (which is the lag length chosen by both the AIC and the
HQ criterium), and the model-two preference shock by the terms of trade at q = 6 (again, the
common lag length of the AIC and HQ criterium). However, in all three cases the predictive
ability of the alternative shock measures is small. When we exclude them from the regression
the adjusted R2 decreases by 0.047, 0.052, and 0.052, respectively.
Considering both subsamples together we performed 105 different tests, each at the five
percent level. Therefore, we can expect that on average we will get about five rejections of
the null despite it being true.14 It is safe to conclude that for the West German economy
between 60.i and 89.iv the measures we have identified may be regarded as exogenous driving
forces of small scale macroeconomic models, as the ones we have specified in model one and
model two.
13We run a Monte Carlo experiment to confirm this supposition. We generated at random 100 bivariate
VARs with order randomly selected between 1 and 4 and counted the number of instances where the test
correctly rejected the null of no Granger causality. In the VARs with 56 observations this was on average the
case in 91 percent of the simulations, whereas in the VARs with 120 observations the rejection rate was 95
percent on average.
14Strictly speaking the Type I error refers to repeated sampling from the same distribution. Here, we must
regard each sample as a realization of a different stochastic process. Yet even under this interpretation one can
expect rejection of a true null. A simple experiment confirms this: we generated two independent, stationary
AR(p)-processes using random number generators to pick p, the coefficients of the two processes, the standard
deviation of their innovations, and the innovations and tested for Granger causality. In 100 tests we find on
average more than 5 rejections of the true null of no Granger causality.
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Table III.4:
Bivariate Granger Causality Tests 60.i-89.iv
Model-One Shock Measures
Variable Productivity Preferences
AIC HQ AIC HQ
q r p q r p q r p q r p
Government Expenditures 7 1 0.32 5 1 0.33 5 0 0.34 1 1 .
Taxes 6 1 0.05 1 2 . 4 0 0.31 1 0 .
M1 6 0 0.13 6 0 0.13 7 0 0.86 6 0 0.80
M3 6 0 0.27 6 0 0.27 8 2 0.31 6 0 0.95
Short-Term Interest Rate 6 0 0.09 5 0 0.44 5 1 0.77 5 1 0.77
Long-Term Interest Rate 6 0 0.04 5 0 0.23 4 0 0.42 2 0 0.25
Exports 6 0 0.51 6 0 0.51 6 0 0.27 5 0 0.57
Terms of Trade 6 0 0.44 6 0 0.44 6 0 0.14 6 0 0.14
Oil Price 5 1 0.95 2 1 0.73 4 0 0.64 2 0 0.11
Model-Two Shock Measures
Variable Productivity Preferences
AIC HQ AIC HQ
q r p q r p q r p q r p
Government Expenditures 8 2 0.30 1 2 . 5 0 0.61 1 0 .
Taxes 5 1 0.72 1 2 . 4 0 0.39 4 0 0.39
M1 6 0 0.35 6 0 0.35 6 1 0.40 6 1 0.40
M3 6 0 0.03 6 0 0.03 6 0 0.77 6 0 0.77
Short-Term Interest Rate 5 0 0.66 5 0 0.66 5 1 0.44 5 1 0.44
Long-Term Interest Rate 6 0 0.18 2 0 0.81 4 0 0.23 4 0 0.23
Exports 5 0 0.92 5 0 0.92 6 0 0.39 5 0 0.32
Terms of Trade 6 0 0.09 6 0 0.09 6 0 0.03 6 0 0.03
Notes: See Table III.3.
Do these results indicate that the West-German case is different from those of the countries
considered so far? It may be too early to draw this conclusion. Our study differs from the
studies gathered in Table I.1 in an important point: we employ an error correction framework
whereas – except for Holland and Scott (1998) – all other investigations use growth rates or
other stationary-inducing transformations of the data. However, it is well known that in the
face of cointegration the estimation of a VAR in first differences provides incorrect answers.
With respect to the Holland and Scott (1998) findings, this critique does not apply, and we
conclude that the West-German case indeed differs from the UK.
Turning to our third subperiod this conclusion seems less robust, at least at first glance.
According to Table III.5, the model-one preference shock is Granger caused by exports at
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Table III.5:
Bivariate Granger Causality Tests 70.i-01.iv: First Differences
Model-One Shock Measures
Variable Productivity Preferences
AIC HQ AIC HQ
q p q p q p q p
Government Expenditures 8 0.52 1 0.17 8 0.37 8 0.37
Taxes 4 0.09 0 . 4 0.56 4 0.56
M1 2 0.00 2 0.00 3 0.00 3 0.00
M3 2 0.00 2 0.00 3 0.00 3 0.00
Short Term Interest Rate 1 0.54 1 0.54 3 0.92 1 0.66
Long Term Interest Rate 1 0.57 1 0.57 4 0.09 1 0.16
Exports 8 0.92 4 0.84 8 0.02 4 0.17
Terms of Trade 8 0.05 1 0.52 8 0.44 8 0.44
Oil Price 5 0.31 1 0.45 5 0.00 4 0.00
Model-Two Shock Measures
Variable Productivity Preferences
AIC HQ AIC HQ
q p q p q p q p
Government Expenditures 8 0.33 1 0.17 8 0.08 2 0.44
Taxes 4 0.07 0 . 4 0.30 0 .
M1 2 0.00 2 0.00 4 0.00 3 0.00
M3 3 0.00 2 0.00 3 0.00 2 0.00
Short Term Interest Rate 1 0.46 1 0.46 1 0.57 1 0.57
Long Term Interest Rate 1 0.66 1 0.66 4 0.04 1 0.36
Exports 8 0.87 4 0.65 8 0.03 4 0.09
Terms of Trade 8 0.05 1 0.94 8 0.21 1 0.17
Notes: See Table III.3.
q = 8, and by the oil price at both lag lengths considered. We find the latter result also
in the error-correction framework presented in Table III.6 but not the first one. Less robust
are also other instances of Granger causality since they emerge either in the error-correction
framework or in the VAR in differences but not in both sets of tests. For instance, the long-
term interest rate Granger causes the model-two preference shock in the VAR(4) but neither
in the VAR(1) nor in the VECs. Government expenditures Grange cause both the model-one
and the model-two productivity shock in the error-correction framework but not in the VARs
in first differences.
Most obvious, however, is that all four of our shock measures are Granger caused by
M1 and M3 according to both kinds of tests. When we consider three dimensional VARs
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Table III.6:
Bivariate Granger Causality Tests 70.i-01.iv: Error Correction, r=1
Model-One Shock Measures
Variable Productivity Preferences
AIC HQ AIC HQ
q p q p q p q p
Government Expenditures 7 0.02 4 0.01 5 0.26 1 .
Taxes 2 0.45 2 0.45 8 0.51 1 .
M1 6 0.00 3 0.00 4 0.00 4 0.00
M3 6 0.00 3 0.00 4 0.00 4 0.00
Short Term Interest Rate 2 0.93 2 0.93 5 0.79 2 0.85
Long Term Interest Rate 2 0.18 2 0.18 4 0.41 2 0.27
Exports 5 0.35 5 0.35 5 0.30 5 0.30
Terms of Trade 6 0.95 2 0.84 6 0.37 6 0.37
Oil Price 6 0.61 2 0.31 6 0.01 5 0.00
Model-Two Shock Measures
Variable Productivity Preferences
AIC HQ AIC HQ
q p q p q p q p
Government Expenditures 5 0.00 4 0.00 7 0.01 2 0.61
Taxes 6 0.34 2 0.78 8 0.64 1 .
M1 3 0.00 3 0.00 4 0.00 4 0.00
M3 3 0.00 3 0.00 4 0.00 4 0.00
Short Term Interest Rate 2 0.83 2 0.83 2 0.97 2 0.97
Long Term Interest Rate 2 0.25 2 0.25 4 0.71 2 0.63
Exports 5 0.03 5 0.03 5 0.28 5 0.28
Terms of Trade 7 0.20 2 0.70 6 0.37 2 0.21
Notes: See Table III.3.
which include both M1 and M3 and allow for one cointegrating relation, we cannot reject
that M1 has no effect on either one of our four shocks (see Table A.8 in the Appendix).
Furthermore, we are not able to reject the null that our shocks do not Granger cause M3.
Thus, it seems that causality runs from M3 to the shocks. Given that there is no convincing
evidence for this finding in the West German data, we attribute this outcome to the structural
breaks associated with both the German unification and the introduction of the European
monetary union. Indeed, since the German monetary union became effective on July 1,
1990, M3 started to increase in 91.ii whereas our shock measures display their breaks two
quarters later. However, we were not successful in controlling for this jump using a second
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dummy variable. Nevertheless, we hesitate to conclude that our shock measures reflect signs of
’regular’ monetary policy shocks as opposed to those related to the changes in the institutional
framework.
IV. Conclusion
The plausibility of small scale dynamic general equilibrium models of the business cycle driven
by shocks to productivity and preferences depends upon whether or not these shocks can
be considered exogenous with respect to other possible shock measures such as government
expenditures, tax rates, money supply, interest rates, foreign demand, or world market prices.
We consider this question with respect to the West German and German economy within the
framework of two models. Model one is a standard real business cycle model whereas model
two allows for variable capital utilization and the declining trend in West German working
hours per capita. We use these models to identify shocks to total factor productivity and
the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption for three periods: 76.i
to 89.iv, 60.i to 89.iv and 70.i to 01.iv. The first subperiod fits our theoretical assumptions
closest but has relatively few observations. The related shortage of degrees of freedom for
our econometric tests is not shared by our second subsample. While covering the more recent
German economic history, the third subperiod suffers from the breaks in most economic time
series that arise from the German reunification and from the introduction of the European
monetary union.
For the West German economy, i.e., during the period 60.i to 89.iv, our Granger causality
tests support the exogeneity of our shock measures. This is reflected in the fact that only 5
out of a total of 105 different tests reject the null of Granger causality at the five percent level
of significance. This is less than the type I error.
The results for the more recent period 70.i to 01.iv are less favorable. We find more
instances of Granger causality. However, except for the monetary aggregates M1 and M3,
only one instance (the oil price causes the model-one preference shock) is robust to different
specifications with respect to the lag length and the number of cointegrating relations. M1
and M3 appear to Grange cause all of our shock measures independent of the specification
of the vector autoregressive models (VARs). Three-dimensional VARs with M1, M3, and the
respective shock measure reveal that the ultimate influence comes from M3. Considering that
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